Vladimir Putin is threatening Ukraine again. The West so far lacks a unified and effective way of dealing with this and other challenges from Russia. As fighting has in recent weeks surged in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, which is in part controlled by a Russian puppet regime, Ukrainian casualties have increased and Russian regular forces are poised near the Ukrainian border – a parallel with 2014 that ended up with an invasion. So what is Russian president Vladimir Putin up to, and what should the EU and NATO do about it?
Russia will hold parliamentary elections in September. They will not be free or fair, but President Vladimir Putin needs the results to have a veneer of credibility. Things have not gone well for him domestically, however, since the Russian constitution was amended last year to allow him to stay in power until 2036. Russia’s COVID-related excess death rate is among the highest in the world, growth forecasts for the next few years are anaemic, and opinion polls show that most Russians view Putin’s economic policies as unsuccessful. Protests against the detention of opposition leader and anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny in January were the largest in almost a decade. Perhaps that explains why he is turning to old stratagems, cracking down on the opposition at home and creating distractions abroad: he hopes to silence critics, create a burst of patriotic support and secure the election outcome he wants.
Hence, the manoeuvres around Ukraine may only be intended to apply psychological pressure to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and underline his country’s vulnerability. Alternatively, Russia’s military actions may be intended primarily to unsettle Western countries. Putin may think that talk of renewed war leading to the proclaimed destruction of Ukraine will persuade France and Germany, the mediators of the Minsk agreements, to lean on Zelenskyy to make concessions. Implementation of the agreements has largely stalled since a burst of progress after Zelenskyy was elected in 2019. Concessions might include giving the Kremlin’s proxies in the Donbas a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy, or allowing Russia to place its forces along the line of contact as ‘peacekeepers’ – as it has done recently between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces around Nagorno-Karabakh. Experience elsewhere in the former Soviet Union shows that Russian peacekeepers are rarely neutral, and are hard to dislodge. Or the Kremlin may in fact be preparing a new invasion for the summer, as indicated by increased Russian propaganda accusing Ukraine of preparing to attack the ‘separatist’ areas, and planning ‘genocide’ against ethnic Russians.
Regardless of which thesis is true, the US and other Western countries should have two goals: to reassure Ukraine, so that it does not feel compelled to take rash pre-emptive action, and to deter Russia by shifting the cost-benefit calculation in favour of de-escalation. Despite some Western leaders‘ reiterated support for Ukraine, there is not enough clarity about the negative consequences for the Putin regime of a renewed push into Ukrainian territory, nor about what the West might do to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine, for its part, is less likely to try to strike first, in anticipation of a Russian push, if it is confident that it can hold its positions along the line of contact. Ukraine’s forces are much more capable than they were in 2014, but Western countries should work with them to identify and fill the gaps in their defensive armoury, and to provide training where necessary. The UK has announced that it will form a ‘Ranger Regiment’ later this year to train, advise and accompany partners in high threat environments, which could make a bigger contribution to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area if deployed in Ukraine.
Western countries also need to show more political support for Ukraine, without encouraging unrealistic expectations. NATO governments are even more divided over allowing Ukraine to progress towards NATO membership than they were at the Bucharest summit in 2008, when they unwisely promised Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership without a timetable or a pathway to achieving it. Putin knows that the West has no wish to go to war for Ukraine; the West must therefore show it will also raise the cost of aggression in other ways. The EU, UK, US and other Western supporters of Ukraine should make clear in their contacts with the Russian authorities that they are working on co-ordinated packages of new sanctions –designed to do real damage to the sectors of the economy on which the Putin regime relies, particularly the oil and gas industry, and to Russia’s access to the international financial system – that could be deployed quickly in the event that Russian forces cross the border again. But in devising and advocating for sanctions, the US must be sensitive to the fact that its European partners have much more at stake economically than it does – in 2019, EU trade with Russia was more than nine times greater than US trade with Russia. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea should be top of the target list for sanctions.
The security of Ukraine is the most urgent but far from the only Russia-related challenge facing the West. After 20 years of Putin, Western countries have still not devised a comprehensive strategy to combat his ability to disrupt those he perceives as adversaries. Just as important as buttressing Ukraine is countering broader Russian efforts to subvert liberal democratic systems. The Kremlin showed in the US in 2016 and 2020 and in France in 2017 that it is able and willing to interfere in elections. It would be naïve to think that the threat has gone away. Germany faces Bundestag elections in September 2021; the first round of the French presidential election is in April 2022. Western powers need to share information and best practice in combating disinformation and manipulation of voters, and to identify, expose and where possible prosecute Russian agents of influence in their political systems.
Western countries must also ensure that their armed forces are adequate to deter any future Russian efforts to intimidate or coerce them. Putin’s military modernisation programme has passed its peak and the Russian defence budget in 2019 was about 10% less than in 2016, but it still accounts for almost 4% of GDP, compared with a NATO average (excluding the US) of 1.7%. Russia’s armed forces are much better equipped and more capable than they were when they defeated Georgia in 2008. The UK’s recent ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ described Russia as “the most acute threat to our security” – a view probably shared by many countries in Central and Northern Europe. Also in light of Putin’s emphasis in recent years on the new nuclear weapons, NATO needs credible conventional and nuclear counters to maintain deterrence. And the West also needs a dialogue with Russia that ensures that each side understands the other’s aims and red lines – though Russia has so far refused to engage with existing international mechanisms for clarifying military intentions.
The human rights situation in Russia, though deteriorating, is not a direct threat to Western interests in the way that, for example a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be, hence human rights should not be a driver of policy – even in the case of a figure as prominent as Navalny. A more coherent Western approach to Russia must be based on limiting the damage it can do to the interests of EU and NATO countries and their Eastern European neighbours, above all Ukraine but also Belarus – still a possible target for incorporation into Russia. Putin could be in office for another decade or more; he is unlikely to shed his distrust of NATO and the EU, or to stop seeking a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. Some European politicians, including Emmanuel Macron, continue to argue that Europe must improve its relations with Russia through dialogue. The West should indeed keep talking to the Kremlin and to Russian society more widely, but without illusions that there will be a fundamental change in relations. Putin’s zero-sum worldview, generally shared in the Russian political establishment, will guide Russia’s external behaviour for the foreseeable future. All Western countries can do is try to ensure that they and their partners do not end up on the losing side.
‘Russia, Ukraine and the West: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Vladimir?’ – Policy Brief by Ian Bond – Centre for European Reform / CER.
